incompleteness has some version of self-referential paradoxicality lurking around in the background" (Goldstein, p. 165, n.5). The mathematical technicality here is the numbering system invented by Gödel. This numbering system allows "propositions to engage in an interesting sort of double speak, saying something arithmetical and also commenting on their own situation with the formal system" (Goldstein, p. 176) . This explains why Derrida can use an analogy to Gödelian undecidability, self reference, and paradox to illustrate Mallarméan self referential allusion. Derrida, at this phase of his career, is also much interested in words which themselves have double, contradictory meanings; he found a consistent pattern of use of such words in the philosophical treatment of the relation between writing and language itself.
Derrida has carefully specified that this has nothing to do with something like "the antithetical meaning of primal words." Rather, these words themselves mark the undecidable, paradoxical processes Mallarmé and Gödel are describing, and that Freud encounters when he examine the uncanny. In fact, Unheimlich itself is such a word, an important point for Freud.
A few basic points from Das Unheimliche (1919) . Speaking of the uncanny effect of the double, Freud says: ". . . the subject identifies himself with someone else, so that he is in doubt as to which his self is, or substitutes the extraneous self for his own. In other words, there is a doubling, dividing and interchanging of the self" (17, 235) . The very next sentence reads: "And finally there is the constant recurrence of the same thing. . . " (ibid.). It is not clear in context whether Freud sees that doubling itself is repetition; rather he seems to be making a list of uncanny effects. He goes on to cite Rank on the theme of the double, particularly the idea of the double as insurance against destruction of the ego. This is what led the Egyptians to make images of the dead in "lasting materials"-i.e. as indestructible doubles of the once living person. Freud comments that ideas of indestructibility derive from "the soil of unbounded selflove, from the primary narcissism which dominates the mind of the child and of primitive man.
But when this stage has been surmounted, the 'double' reverses its aspect. From having been an assurance of immortality, it becomes the uncanny harbinger of death" (ibid.).
Freud pursues the theme of uncanniness in relation to primary narcissism on the next page. "When all is said and done, the quality of uncanniness can only [my emphasis, nur in the original] come from the fact of the 'double' being a creation dating back to a very early mental stage, long since surmounted-a stage, incidentally, at which it wore a more friendly aspect.
The 'double' has become a thing of terror. . . other forms of ego-disturbance. . . can easily be estimated along the same lines as the theme of the 'double.' They are a harking back to particular phases in the evolution of the self-regarding feeling, a regression to a time when the ego had not yet marked itself off sharply from the external world and from other people. I believe that these factors are partly responsible for the impression of uncanniness, although it is not easy to isolate and determine exactly their share of it." New paragraph: "The factor of the repetition of the same thing will perhaps not appeal to everyone as a source of uncanny feeling" (17, 236) . Again, from doubling to repetition.
Freud's reasoning is that the psychological origin of the uncanny double can only be primary narcissism, the stage at which there is no division of internal and external, subject and object. To use Freud's later expression (1941) "being the breast precedes having the breast" (23, 250) . If one is the breast, however, there is "doubling, dividing, and interchanging of the self." One is as the repetition of oneself. Since doubling is also dividing, one is as the difference of oneself. Every self-referential paradox has this structure: it is always in difference from itself, and hence practices a kind of double speak. Freud does not account for the transition between the "friendly" and terrifying aspects of uncanniness. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that as the possibility of doubling and dividing, primary narcissism, the relation of the baby to the breast, is in and of itself "friendly" and terrifying. The overall point, as indicated in Freud's gerunds-doubling, dividing, interchanging-is that this is a self-referential process. So we circle back to Derrida on Mallarmé's self referential process of allusion, the analogy to Gödel, and the rereading of "The Uncanny." Derrida had said that Mallarméan allusion is not illusion, but neither is it real in the sense of being objectively true or false. Confronted with exactly this implication of mathematical reality, Gödel famously took it as vindication of Plato on the reality of a pure, abstract realm accessible only by reason. However, it is a strange Platonism that would have to include the reality of neither true nor false self-referential paradoxes. On the other side, we all know Freud's arguments for psychoanalytic positivism. But it would be a strange positivism that would have to include the reality of uncanny doubling, dividing repetition at the heart of unconscious processes--primary narcissism as the only possible origin of uncanniness. One of the most important implications of Derrida's juxtaposition of Mallarmé, Gödel, and Freud is that the reality each describes cannot be transcendental or empirical. In all his readings of "The Uncanny" Derrida has emphasized Freud's statement that literature "is a much more fertile province than the uncanny in real life, for it contains the whole of the latter and something more besides, something that cannot be found in real life. . . . The somewhat paradoxical result is that in the first place a great deal that is not uncanny in fiction would be so if it happened in real life; and in the second place that there are many more means of creating uncanny effects in fiction than there are in real life " (17, 249). Freud is noting a paradoxical result about the relation between "real life" and fiction as concerns the uncanny. Is he stumbling upon an aspect of reality that is as paradox, that is fictive, but not in the sense of illusion? Can we extend this idea to primary narcissism as the possibility of uncanniness--fictive, neither true nor false, but real? Paradoxical, undecidable, and unpredictable? Let us step back for a moment, and not forget that Freud mainly understands uncanniness in terms of the return of the repressed-the unfamiliar at the heart of the familiar.
The return of the repressed has two aspects: return and repressed. The latter is contentsexuality, aggression, wishes, fantasies, etc. The former is process-return itself, repetition.
When one thinks of clinical process in Freud's sense, on the whole one thinks of interpretation of fantasy, wish, drive, anxiety, defense, transference, and especially transference-resistance. From Freud's point of view, such clinical process justifies psychoanalytic positivism. When he speaks of repetition, the repetition compulsion, and return, he does not consider repetition as a process, a self-referential, paradoxical process, although he hints at this in "The Uncanny."
Nor does he ever link the process of repetition to the very repetitive process that is psychoanalysis itself, in the literal sense of the return of the patient to the analyst's office over a long period of time. But it is precisely this repetition that unpredictably makes a difference. This is the impersonal process-it is the same for every patient-that enframes the intensely Bahnung. My idea is that one also has to consider Bahnung in relation to primary narcissism, or even "being the breast." In other words, the context in which Bahnung occurs as difference and repetition is the context in which there is no subject or object. Hence, the process is auto-affective, self-referential. I think this is why Freud later saw the origin of the uncanny in primary narcissism, and why Bahnung, even if "friendly," itself implies doubling and dividing of the self. And when Freud says in the Project that the experience of satisfaction is the origin of a relation to the world and to thought, such that we always cognize in relation to an other (1, 331), I think he is providing a model for the psychoanalytic process itself. One makes a difference in the other when they repeatedly join in the uncanny space of primary narcissism.
Here I am combining Freud's speculations about the brain with some of his psychological thinking. Strikingly, there are aspects of contemporary thinking about the brain that situate such processes in neuronal matter itself, which was Freud's intent in the Project. I want to speak of some of this thinking, mainly to see what kind of language scientists find themselves having to use to describe such unusual aspects of reality.
The great evolutionary thinker of contemporary neuroscience is Gerald Edelman, who dedicates Bright Air, Brilliant Fire to Darwin and Freud. His aim is to apply Darwinian ideas about populations to how mind emerges from the matter of the brain. Edelman's point of departure is a neurological fact about the brain: even though the brain gets input from the sense organs, the reality of brain-mind. This reality can be seen in the way Gödel and Penrose call "Platonic."
There is a wonderful contradiction here. Penrose accurately links quantum phenomena to the actual world. As he writes about the most familiar example of complementarity: "How is it that light can consist of particles and of field oscillations at the same time? These two conceptions seem irrevocably opposed. . . [T] he dichotomy between particles and field that had been a feature of classical theory is not respected by Nature. . . Somehow Nature contrives to build a consistent world in which particles and field-oscillations are the same thing! Or, rather, her world consists of some more subtle ingredient, the words 'particle' and 'wave' conveying but partially appropriate pictures" (230-1). This is why Bohr and Heisenberg considered themselves positivists. They were describing the real world. But their positivism is just as strange as Gödel's Platonism. What is a positivism of uncertainty and complementarity? Of the reality of intermediacy?
There are many other examples of intermediacy in quantum theory. Again, contrary to popular opinion, subatomic processes are not completely probabilistic, nor are macroscopic processes completely deterministic. For instance, on the subatomic level, as Max Born put it, the motion of particles follows probability laws, but the probability itself propagates according to the law of causality (Pais 258). This is akin to Penrose's statement that nature comprises something between particles and wave, and so inevitably something between chance and causality. Born took an image from Einstein to describe the relation between a wave field and light quanta. The way in which the wave field determines the probability of a light quantum makes it virtual, spectral, literally a "'ghost field'" (ibid.) Dirac, describing processes of photon-light particle-scattering, found simultaneous absorption and emission of energy, which appears to I am deliberately using examples which recall Derrida: the between of chance and causality, virtuality, spectrality, double meaning. Arkady Plotnitsky has in fact articulated the theoretical links between Gödel, quantum theory, and Derrida, and has extended them to psychoanalysis. He writes: "The undecidability of mathematical logic [Gödel] does not lead strictly to complementarity as uncertainty does in quantum mechanics; but it does suggest, metaphorically, the possibility-and perhaps the necessity-of a kind of undecidable complementarity. The latter may be found in Derrida, where it indicates a relation to, and dependence-theoretical, metaphorical, and historical-on both models, that of Gödelian logic and that of quantum mechanics" (71). Plotnitsky advocates an integration of the rethinking of matter with the Freudian unconscious via Derrida, particularly via Derrida's reading of the is actually delayed by about half a second from the 'actual' time-as though one's internal clock is simply 'wrong' by about half a second or so. The time at which one perceives an event to take place would then always be half a second after the actual occurrence of that event. This would present a consistent, albeit disturbingly delayed, picture of sense impressions" (441-2).
Penrose says that we are probably "wrong when we apply the usual physical rules for time when we consider consciousness. . . I think that it is possible that a very different conception may be required when we try to place conscious perception into a conventionally time-ordered framework" (443). Returning to the topic of how one "sees" something that is demonstrable but not perceivable, (the question he raised about Gödelian undecidability), Penrose restates his Platonic convictions about a timeless, transcendental realm accessible only by reason. Here, it seems to me, he is unable to envision that the other thinking of time he is after is precisely one which thinks the primacy of delay, as per Derrida's reading of the Project. 
